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CONVERTIBLE BONDS
The rise in convertible bond offerings has been a striking development
of postwar bond financing. In part this was a natural development
since it was virtually the only way in which equity investments could
be sold to a market largely institutional in nature. The largest user of
convertible bond issues by far has been the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company. While the convertible feature is not new, as will
be seen, its popularity in the postwar period is probably the result of
a special need for equity funds by a few major corporations and, until
the late 1950's, when pension-fund stock purchasing began in volume,
lack of any institutional source of equity money. The rising stock
market throughout most of the postwar period made convertibles the
cheapest method of external financing for many corporations.
Ordinarily, convertible bonds have been issued as debentures. There
is generally a schedule of prices at which the bond is convertible at
different times. The investor receives both the protection of the bond
and the opportunity to share in a rise in value of the common stock.
The issuing corporation, on the other hand, is able to raise capital at
moderate interest cost, and if the company prospers the issuing cor-
poration will find its fixed income obligations eliminated automatically
as holders exchange them for common stock.
Investment textbooks until recently were unfavorably disposed
toward these issues, the conversion feature of which was interpreted
as a substitute for quality. Indeed, a well-known text had the following
advice to give on convertible issues: "... investorsshould approach
these offerings with an eye for a possible Trojan horse." 1
Whilethere is no precise rule for valuing convertible bonds, many
investors determine their attractiveness according to how much pre-
mium is paid over comparable fixed-income securities without the
conversion feature. This is one important reason why the so-called
1BenjaminGraham and David L. Dodd, Security Analysis, 3rd ed., New York,
1951, p. 523.— — w w-
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market rating fails to give a significant indication of corporate bond
quality per se in the postwar period. However, the majority of postwar
investors in convertible bonds have not been so prudent as to test their
value as a fixed-income security. Instead, as the bull market of the late
1950's continued to gather steam, convertible bonds became increas-
ingly popular with investors and with corporations needing capital
funds.
Why are convertible bonds possibly of greater risk than other bonds?
The convertible feature of itself does not worsen the quality of a fixed-
income security. So long as conversion is at the privilege of the bond-
holder, there is no reason why a convertible bond is any more risky
than a nonconvertible bond. Rather, other attributes of the fixed-
income obligation, attributes frequently closely associated with the
convertibility feature, may induce added risk. In the first place, con-
vertible bonds may be sold by corporations unable to market regular
bond issues. Second, convertible bonds are nearly always unsecured by
any but the general credit of the corporation and are often subordinate
to other debt. In case of default, this may mean a poorer settlement.
Finally, more often than not, speculative demand for convertible bonds
may induce purchasers to pay more than is warranted by the risks in-
volved. In the postwar period, convertible bonds have been a particu-
larly favored instrument for equity-type speculation since stock margin
requirements do not apply to them.
The Prewar Experience
The prevalence of convertible issues in the late postwar period suggests
that it might be appropriate to examine their earlier record. How did
bonds convertible into common stocks make out in the early 1930's? 2
Howwere they judged at the time of their offering, and how did these
judgments work out in time of general defaults? The history of the
1920's and 1930's may offer insights about the effect of convertible
issues on aggregate bond quality.
Table 31 shows that convertibles were some 10 per cent of the volume
of straight corporate bond financing during the 1900—43 period. The
peak was in 1929, when they accounted for 40 per cent of all straight
2Afew convertible bonds issued prior to World War II were convertible into pre-
ferred stock or other classes of bonds. These have been excluded from the present
study._ S W
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TABLE 31
Amount and Proportion of All Offerings of Bonds
Convertible into Common Stock, 1900-65
(dollars in millions)
Yearof Con- PerYearof Con- Per
OfferingsvertibleAllCentOfferingsvertibleAllCent
1900 11.2 693.41.6 1933 39.8 444.39.0
1901 125.01489.08.4 1934 129.1 581.322.2
1902 .65.61009.86.5 1935 115.82314.95.0.
1903 32.6 919.23.5 1936 142.73666.13.9
1904 33.11092.03.0 1937 257.31561.616.5
1905 164.51226.013.4 1938 218.91960.111.2
1906 184.31092.016.9 1939 260.62213.111.8
1907 166.61089.315.3 1940 11.52416.40.5
1908 106.51112.19.6 1941 256.12005.212.8
1909 198.41264.015.7 1942 46.3 897.75.2
1910 123.51133.210.9 1943 0.0 809.50.0
1911 29.11299.52:2 1944 34.22194.31.6
1912 74.31396.95.3 1945 13.04245.30.3
1913 218.71167.618.7 1946 401.93810.310.5
1914 75.31193.46.3 1947 396.63725.910.6
1915 198.91184.816.8 1948 230.44064.85.7
1916 193.51485.013.0 1949 428.43490.212.3
1917 68.41228.65.6 1950 122.63730.73.3
1918 111.2 800.413.9 1951 472.84536.910.4
1919 141.91038.713.7 1952 908.95070.615.2
1920 275.01448.019.0 1953 949.34998.519.0
1921 102.02074.64:9 1954 133.96049.22.2
1922 148.12270.26.5 1955 1412.15278.626.8
1923 134.62118.26.4 1956 757.65987.112.7
1924 .79.42227.03.6 1957 1056.77972.913.3
1925 159.82202.47.3 1958 1115.47966.714.0
1926 186.42724.86.8 1959 618.55343.711.6
1927 156.83856.84.1 1960 358.55602.06.4
1928 294.32997.09.8 1961 525.77154.97.3
1929 788.51957.740.3 1962 301.57201.34.2
1930 570.42978.319.2 1963 280.97695.63.7
1931 58.52030.12.9 1964 352.77145.04.9
1932 30.6 873.73.5 1965 888.98962.99.9
Source:1900-43: Hickman, Statistical Measures of Corporate Bond
Financing, Tables 70 and 118; 1944-65:Tables D-1 and F-I.- - w w
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offerings. Our figures for the postwar period indicate that convertibles
have also comprised about 10 per cent of all corporate debt offerings,
or 16 per cent of public offerings. The peak was in 1955, with $1.4
billion in debt issues representing 27 per cent of total marketing of
bonds. (The corresponding figures for public offerings are $1.3 billion
and 46 per cent.)
In the 1920's and 1980's, the proportion of convertibles going into
default was twice that for all corporate bonds, and this relationship
apparently did not change between the two decades analyzed (Table
Table 33 and Chart 13 show default rates for convertibles and for
all bonds by year of offering. Since the number of convertible issues
was relatively small in many years, default rates would be expected to
vary more on them than on nonconvertible bonds. The chart shows a
tendency for the years that produced high-grade convertible bonds to
produce low-grade nonconvertibles and vice versa. The proportion of
bond offerings with convertible privileges is also shown on the chart.
In general, years that produced a high proportion of convertibles ulti-
mately going to default were those years when convertibles were
relatively scarce. This suggests that the high volume of convertibles
issued in the postwar period does not in itself mean an increased
incidence of convertible bond defaults.
May convertible bonds be rated as to likelihood of default as effi-
ciently as others? A look at the proportion of convertibles classified
as poor risk according to agency ratings, times-charges-earned, market
TABLE 32
Average Annual Default Rates, All Corporate Bonds and
Convertible Bonds Outstanding, 1920-39
(per cent)
Period of Defaults All Bonds Convertible Bonds
1920-29 1.0 2.2
1930-39 3.2 6.3
Source:All bonds from Hickman, Volume of Corporate Bond
Financing, Table 22, p. 208; convertibles computed from data compiled
by Corporate Bond Research Project, on file at NBER.80 Trendsin Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 33
Default Rates by Year of Offering, Convertible and
Nonconvertible Bonds, 1900-43













1900 0.0 35.1 1922 24.7 14.6
1901 8.0 29.6 1923 17.8 11.9
1902 23.8 48.4 1924 0.0 22.6
1903 54.0 29.5 1925 19.6 18.1
1904 59.2 43.2 1926 5.2 22.9
1905 13.4 40.2 1927 35.4 26.8
1906 14.4 45.8 1928 44.1 39.0
1907 20.4 38.1 1929 38.3 30.0
1908 49.8 29.6 1930 52.3 21.9
1909 16.0 36.5 1931 23.4 18.0
1910 4.5 26.0 1932 74.5 12.6
1911 39.9 32.7 1933 0.0 36.8
1912 47.0 28.3 1934 0.0 14.5
1913 39.9 42.8 1935 0.0 6.9
1914 1.6 31.6 1936 0.0 3.0
1915 14.6 26.9 1937 0.0 0.4
1916 16.2 30.5 1938 0.0 0.0
1917 0.0 26.2 1939 0.0 0.5
1918 18.0 27.3 1940 0.0 0.1
1919 15.1 12.2 1941 0.0 1.1
1920 28.7 14.8 1942 0.0 0.0
1921 37.9 11.9 1943 — 1.6
Source: Same as Table 32 for convertibles.Convertible Bonds 81
CHART13
Default Rates for Convertible and Nonconvertible Corporate Bonds and
Proportion of New Offerings with Conversion Provisions,
by Year of Offering, 1900—43
Source: Tables 31 and 33.
New Offerings with Conversion Provisions82 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 34
Distribution of Percentage of Dollar Volume of Bond Offerings by
Agency Ratings, Convertibles and Nonconvertibles, 1910-39.






1926 83.116.9 0.0100.080.318.0 1.7100.0
1927 74.022.1 3.8100.082.217.4 0.4100.0
1928 80.013.3 6.7100.069.927.6 2.6 10O.0
1929 72.424.1 3.5100.067.525.0 7.5100.0
1930 44.3 1.2100.091.3 5.8 2.9100.0
Source:Se,e source for Table 33.
Note:Detail may not add to total because of rounding.
aN.R. =notrated.
rating, and lien position prior to World War II will show how accu-
rately these measures operated in predicting default.
Agency ratings of convertible and nonconvertible bonds by year of
offering are shown in Table 34. The years 1910—19 are not comparable
with the other periods because only railroad bonds were rated in the
early years of that period. Nonconvertibles were rated somewhat higher
than convertibles in the decade of the twenties, but the individual years
did not all show the same pattern. The greatest difference in the treat-
ment of convertibles and nonconvertibles by rating agencies was in
the 1930's. Not until 1930 did convertible bonds bear agency ratings
markedly below nonconvertible bonds. In 1929, which was a peak year
in convertible financing, nonconvertibles and convertibles bore about
the same portion of the dollar value in the subinvestment grade
(V-TX).
The rating agencies have apparently had as much difficulty with
convertibles as investors have had. Table 35 shows default rates for
convertibles by agency rating. Except for the twenties,'and particularly
the last half of that decade, default rates were no worse on subinvest-
ment-gTade than on investment-grade convertibles. Convertible bondsConvertible Bonds 83
TABLE 35
Default Rates for Convertible Bonds with
Various Agency Ratings, 1910-39
(percentage of total amount offered)
Year or
Period of
Offerings I-IV V-IX Not Rated Total
1910-19 21.6 21.4 12.7 19.6
1920-29 22.6 45.4 87.7 30.4
1930-39 20.6 14.2 33.6 18.4
1926 0.0 30.8 0.0 5.2
1927 34.5 32.3 71.7 35.4
1928 31.0 94.9 1000a 44.1
1929 23.1 753 1000a 38.3
1930 68.5 31.2 100•0a 523
Source: See source for Table 33.
aBased on fewer than five offerings.
not receiving an agency rating were insignificant in the twenties and
thirties, but had much poorer default experience than even those
marked subinvestment grade. The analysis of convertibles by agency
rating suggests that this type of bond was particularly risky in the
depression, when the convertibility feature may well have been used
to cover up other defects of the security. Convertibility itself was ap-
parently not a mark against a bond when judged by the rating agencies
during the 1920's, but in the 1928—29 boom the agencies were able to
detect a relatively high volume of faulty convertibles, as is shown by
the subsequent default record for subinvestment-grade convertibles.
Market yields on convertible bonds are often not commensurate with
the risk of default, and therefore market ratings have little meaning.
Table 36 is presented mainly to show the data for the years 1926
through 1930. In 1926 and 1927 no convertible issues were sold to
yield less than 1 per cent above the basic yield, but in 1928 and 1929
about two-thirds of them had such low yield differentials. In 1930, the
percentage with low yield differentials fell to about half. This suggests
that convertibles are likely to be offered in considerable volume in84 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 36
Percentage of Convertible and Nonconvertible Bonds with
Market Ratings of Less Than 1 Per Cent, 1900-39
Year or











Source: See source for Table 33. Based on par amount of bonds
with market rating.
years of strong stock market action and to be bid up considerably in
value (to have lower yields than if considered strictly as bonds).
In contrast, more nonconvertibles than convertibles yielded less than
1 per cent above the basic yield in 1926, 1927, and againin 1930, when
economic conditions deteriorated. In 1928 and 1929, less noncon-
vertibles than convertibles had such low yield differentials.
It is hard to generalize about either the level or the trend of earnings
coverage for convertibles (see Table 37). In the first decade of the cen-
tury, convertibles had a slightly higher earnings coverage than did
nonconvertibles; in the crucial 1920—29 decade, the two groups had
approximately the same coverage. In 1929, the peak of convertible
bond offerings, average coverage of convertibles after taxes was 2.70
as compared with 2.03 for nonconvertible bOnds. On the other hand,
earnings coverage was less for convertibles than for nonconvertibles in
1926, 1927, 1928, and 1930. Complicating the analysis prior to 1930 was
the fact that rail bonds were not convertible but almost universally had
poor earnings coverage.
Tableshows that, for the first four decades of the century, never
less than 70 per cent of the nonconvertible bond offerings were secured,Convertible Bonds 85
TABLE37
AverageTimes-Charges-Earned Coverage After Taxes, Convertible














1930 1.92 - 2.25
Source: See source for Table 33.
TABLE .38
Percentage of Convertible and NonconvertibleBonds
Classified as Secured, 1900-39
Year or











Source: See source for Table 33.
Note: Bonds on which information on security was unavailable
were omitted from the denominator.86 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
whereas less than half and sometimes less than one-fourth of the con-
vertible issues were secured. Interestingly, the proportion of both con-
vertibles and nonconvertibles that were secured began falling in 1926.
It began rising again for convertibles in 1929 and for nonconvertibles
in 1931.
It is not easy to summarize prewar, investment experience with con-
vertible bonds. As a group, they had a poorer default experience than
nonconvertible bonds, especially in the twenties and thirties. Defaults
among them were particularly high in periods characterized by gen-
erally poor default rates and thus, presumably, lax credit standards.
On the other hand, the relationship between convertibles and poor
quality was scarcely one-for-one; there was some evidence that earnings
coverage of convertibles was as good as for nonconvertibles in the first
three decades analyzed, as well as in the year of greatest convertible
volume, 1929. Seemingly, the convertible feature can be used in two
different ways—as a legitimate device for encouraging investors or as an
eyecatcher for the speculator to induce sales of what otherwise would
be a relatively poor-quality offering. The experience of the prewar
decades may provide some insight into which way convertibles were
used in the postwar era.
Convertibles in the Postwar Period
The evidence suggests that during the postwar period convertible bonds
have been about as popular as in the period 1900—43, if public and
direct offerings in both periods are included, or more popular if direct
placements are excluded from the postwar data. (The early data do not
distinguish between public and direct placements, but the latter ac-
counted for only 7.2 per cent of all offerings in 1900—43 compared with
43.9 per cent in 1944—65.) The postwar peak for proportion of public
offerings with conversion provisions (46 per cent) in 1955 was higher
than the previous peak in 1929. The dollar volume of convertible issues
was well in excess of the amounts in the era Hickman surveyed.
Chart 14 shows the relation between the volume of convertible of-
ferings and stock prices in the postwar period. Rises in the volume of
convertible bond offerings tend to coincide with increases in stock
prices and fall off at or after declines in the stock market. This is as
would be expected for an instrument whose basic appeal is the ability,
of the owner to change from a creditor to an owner status.-_ _
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CHART 14







and Poor's 500 common stock prices
(index, 1941-4310)
'47 '49 '51 '53 '55 '57 '59 '61 '63 '65
Source: Table F-I and Standard and Poor's Security Price Index, annual average
of monthly indexes.
In terms of par amount of public offerings, the proportion of con-
vertibles rose to a peak of 46 per cent in 1955 and then fell to 6 per
cent in 1963, but had risen to 21 per cent by 1965. In terms of number
of public offerings, the proportion of convertibles rose to a peak in
1959 of 42 per cent and then fell to 28 per cent in 1964. Comparison of
the two series shows that the average convertible offering was smaller
in the late fifties and early sixties than in the other postwar years.
Table 39 shows the difference in agency ratings between publicly
offered issues of convertible and nonconvertible bonds. There was a
very modest decrease in the proportion of nonconvertibles which are
rated as subinvestment grade from 1944—62, but 1963—65 suggests a rise.
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TABLE 39
Percentageof Straight Convertible and Nonconvertible Public
Offerings Rated by The Agencies Below Investment Grade, 1944-65
Year or Total Straight
Period of Convertible Nonconvertible Public
Offerings Bonds Bonds Offerings
1944 3.8 2.6 2.6
1945 100.0 4.3 4.4
1946 3.2 3.6 3.6
1947 0.0 0.8 0.7
1948 2.9 0.8 1.0
1949 0.7 2.7 2.3
1950 34.1 0.8 2.9
1951 7.3 1.0 2.3
1952 3.0 0.7 1.3
1953 1.7 0.8 1.1
1954 59.0 2.1 4.1
1955 14.9 1.5 7.6
1956 39.1 3.6 10.7
1957 32.7 1.3 7.6
1958 22.2 0.0 4.1
1959 70.3 2.4 14.6
1960 75.3 2.4 7.9
1961 48.9 0.6 5.6
1962 48.3 0.4 3.0
1963 83.7 3.4 8.2
1964 100.0 7.3 16.6
1965 83.2 4.7 21.0
1944-47 2.1 3.0 3.0
1948-51 6.9 1.3 2.1
1952-55 9.5 1.4 3.5
1956-59 36.7 1.5 8.2
1960-63 62.2 1.7 6.1
1964-65 87.2 5.8 19.3
Source: Computed from Tables B-I and F-2. Based on total rated.Convertible Bonds 89
TABLE 40
Proportion of Par Amount of Straight Public Offerings of Convertible
and Nonconvertible Bonds with Market Rating of
































Source: Compiled from Bond'Survey, as described in text.90 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
with subinvestment ratings from the mid-fifties through the end of the
series. The net effect of the two movements has been a rise in total
low-grade bonds, as measured by agency ratings, from 3 per cent in
1944—47 to 19 percent in 1964—65.
Table 40 is similar to Table 39 except that it is in terms of high-
grade market ratings rather than low-grade agency ratings. The market
was less consistent than the agencies; the agencies rated nonconvertibles
higher than convertibles in all periods except the first (1944—47), while
the market also rated convertibles higher in 1948—51 and 1956—59. At
least, they agreed that convertibles were better in 1944—47 and noncon-
vertibles in 1952—55 and 1960—65.
The Influence of American Telephone Debentures on
Convertible Quality Analysis
In the postwar period the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany used convertible bonds as a major financing device (see Table
41). In the eight issues offered between 1946 and 1958, $3.9 billion par
amount of bonds were created by this firm, or about 36 per cent of all
financing by convertibles in the postwar period (1944—65). Because
obligations of this firm were highly rated (Aa) and because the corn-
TABLE 41
American Telephone and Telegraph Convertibles By Earnings















Source: Same as Table 40.
Note: For these years, all A.T.&T. convertibles had an Aa agency
rating.Convertible Bonds 91
TABLE 42
Median Times-Charges-Earned Ratios Before Taxes, Convertible and
NonconvertThle Public Offerings, by Industry Group, 1945-65
1945-51 1952-58 1959-65
Industrials
Convertibles 13.7 9.5 4.0
Nonconvertibles 17.8 13.6 10.9
Public Utilities
Convertibles 5.2 3.9 3.8
Nonconvertibles 5.4 4.6 4.5
Transportation
Convertibles a L2.0 2.3
Nonconvertibles 5.6 4.8
Source: Special tabulations of data in Table C-I. A.T.&T. con-
vertibles have been omitted (See Table 41).
Note: Ratios were not available for convertible offerings in 1944.
aRatioswere available for only one transportation offering in
1945-5 1.
pany was a unique business enterprise in terms of growth and stability
of earnings and general soundness of its operations, the question natu-
rally arises whether removal of the A.T.&T. issues from the analysis
would appreciably alter the judgment on quality of convertibles.
As is indicated in Table 42, nonconvertibles had higher earnings
coverage in each of the periods into which the postwar is divided and
in major industry groups.
Comparison of Table 43 with Table 39 shows that in four of the
•eight years in which A.T.&T. convertibles were offered, a substantial
proportion of convertibles other than were of subinvestment
grade, and this was hidden by the heavy weight of the A.T.&T. con-
vertible issues in the total. No A.T.&T. convertibles were issued in
1960—65. The comparison of times-charges-earned coverage for con-
vertibles including and excluding A.T.&T. shows the latter was higher
because it consisted mostly of industrials, which generally have higher
earnings coverage (Table 44).92 Trendsin Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 43
Proportionof Convertibles, Other Than Those of American Telephone
and Telegraph, Rated Below Investment Grade, by Year of












Source: Same as for Table F-2.
TABLE .44
Median Times-Charges-Earned Ratios for Convertible Bonds,
Excluding and Including A. T.&T. Convertibles, Combination of Eight
Years in Which A. T.&T. Offered Convertibles
Industry Ratio
A.T.&T. 6.0





Source: Samefor Table 40.
Note: For years included, see Table 41.
aBased on three issues.Convertible Bonds 93
Significantly, the deterioration in quality of bonds in the postwar
period is apparent either including or excluding American Telephone
offerings in the tabulation. The reduced use of convertibles as a means
of American Telephone financing in recent years, however, has meant
that the weakening in quality from early to late postwar years as shown
by this measure is less evident with American Telephone omitted than
with its offerings included.
In summary. the floating number of bonds convertible into common
stock has been a recurrent phenomenon of financing throughout this
century. Convertible bonds have been offered in particularly heavy
volume in sharply rising stock markets or when financing seemed diffi-
cult, particularly for equity funds. Historically, default rates on con-
vertible bonds based on amount in good standing at the beginning of
given years have been roughly double those on issues with no conver-
sion privileges. Default rates based on par amount of offerings have
been much closer for convertible and nonconvertible bonds because
large amounts of the former have been retired (mainly by conversion)
before default occurred. The rating agencies had difficulty evaluating
convertible bonds before 1944. In the postwar period, by most of our
measures, convertible bonds were generally of poorer quality than non-
convertibles. For this reason they have been responsible for some part
of the quality weakening observed to have occurred from the early to
the late postwar period. But if convertible issues had not been per-
mitted in the postwar period, it is quite likely that many of the same
companies would have gone to the straight debt market for funds,
which would have lowered the quality of the nonconvertible bonds
offered. In general, convertibles as a group were improved in quality
by the fact that the American Telephone Company used this means of
financing.0